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The Constitutionality of Introducing
Evaluative Laboratory Reports
Against Criminal Defendants
By EDWARD J. LMWiNKELRIED*
Dean Wigmore, the great Rationalist of American evidence law,
was not content to systematize evidence law; he also attempted to sys-
tematize the history of evidence law.' Wigmore pointed out that in the
first, irrational stage of evidence law, decisionmakers relied on such
primitive practices as trial by ordeal, battle, and compurgation to re-
solve factual questions.2 In its second, rational stage, evidence law
turned to the processes of logic and inference to settle factual disputes.3
Wigmore predicted that evidence law would enter a third, scientific
stage in which the courts would adapt the scientific processes of hy-
pothesis and experiment to decide factual issues.4
Perhaps Dean Wigmore would be gratified to note the extent to
which modern criminal evidence practice has progressed into the scien-
tific stage. One experienced prosecutor recently remarked that "scien-
tific evidence is the backbbne of every circumstantial evidence case."5
* B.A., 1967, J.D., 1969, University of San Francisco. Professor of Law, University of
San Diego School of Law. Former member, Subcommittee on the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure and Evidence, Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association. The au-
thor would like to express his appreciation to Ms. Pamela Slick (class of 1978) and Mr. Paul
Martins (class of 1979) for their assistance in conducting the research for this Article.
1. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8 (3d ed. 1940). See also J. RICHARDSON, MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1.1-.35 (2d ed. 1974).
2. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8 (3d ed. 1940); J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §§ 1.1-.2, 1.5-.6 (2d ed. 1974).
3. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8 (3d ed. 1940); J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENmFIC
EVIDENCE § 1.3 (2d ed. 1974).
4. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940); J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIEN-
TmIc EVIDENCE §§ 1.7-.35 (2d ed. 1974).
5. Clark, Scientific Evidence, in THE PROSECUTOR's DEsKBOOK 542 (P. Healy & J.
Manak eds. 1971) The same text includes Fong, Criminaliscies and the Prosecutor, at 547.
Mr. Fong is a criminalist employed by the Laboratory of Criminalistics, Santa Clara
County, California. He states: "With the attention focused in recent years on the problem of
filling the evidence void created by United States Supreme Court decisions, the role that
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Scientific-evidence texts for criminal practitioners abound.6 Virtually
every seminar on criminal practice includes a presentation on scientific
evidence.7 Scientific-evidence issues have grown into full courses in
law school curricula.
Although prosecutors may welcome the advent of the era of scien-
tific evidence, that era has placed an enormous strain on the limited
resources of police laboratories. Some scientific instrumentation is ex-
tremely expensive, 8 and the increased resort to scientific evidence in
criminal cases unfortunately coincides with the growing pressure on
national, state, and local governments to reduce the level of govern-
ment spending. In many jurisdictions, police laboratories have been
able to cope with growing demands on their facilities only because trial
judges have routinely accepted written reports of forensic analysis
rather than demanding the analysts' personal appearance in the court-
room.9 For example, in some jurisdictions, trial judges customarily ac-
cept laboratory reports of drug analyses rather than insisting on the
chemist's live testimony. The majority of appellate courts have sanc-
tioned the trial judges' willingness to accept written laboratory reports
in lieu of the analysts' personal appearance, 10 and have thereby eased
the burden on police laboratories by admitting reports as business en-
tries," official records,' 2 or past recollection recorded.' 3 The same
courts have brushed aside defense objections to the reports' admis-
sion,14 including the contention that the reports' admission violates the
criminalistics can play in supplying objective scientific evidence has become a matter of
critical importance." Id
6. See, e.g., J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1974); A. MOEN-
SSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (1973).
7. See, e.g., PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 15TH ANNUAL DEFENDING CRIMINAL
CASES: CHANGING FRONTIERS OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1977).
8. Stein, Laessig & Indriksons, 4n Evaluation o/Drug Testing Procedures Used by Fo-
rensic Laboratories and the Qualfications of Their Anaysts, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 739, 762.
9. English, ShouldLaboratory Reports BeAdmittedat Courts-Martial to Identiy/ Illegal
Drugs?, THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 26. If these courts demanded the analysts' ap-
pearance and required analysts to spend much more time in court away from their laborato-
ries, that demand would have an "obviously . . . negative effect upon the volume of
requests processed by these laboratories." Id
10. See, e.g., In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 519, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (Fain. Ct.
1975) (the "holdings elsewhere are clear and strong to the effect that official reports of drug
analyses are admissible without the testimony of the analyst") (citing United States v. Frat-
tini, 501 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1974); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); United
States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1957).
11. See notes 33-41 & accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 42-49 & accompanying text infra.
13. See note 50 & accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 56-82 & accompanying text infra.
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defendants' sixth amendment confrontation rights.15
The thesis of this Article is that the introduction against a defend-
ant of evaluative laboratory reports, as opposed to routine reports, that
are directly relevant to essential elements of the charged crimes violates
the Court's reliability requirement for evidence. The first part of the
Article presents a descriptive survey of the majority view. The second
segment studies the constitutional requirement that prosecution hear-
say evidence be reliable. The third and final part of the Article ana-
lyzes the application of the constitutional reliability requirement to the
majority view.
The Majority View: Laboratory Reports Are Admissible
Against Criminal Defendants
The majority view supporting admissibility has emerged notwith-
standing an old Supreme Court dictum which seems to ban admission
of forensic reports against criminal defendants. In the Court's 1912 de-
cision in Diaz v. United States,16 Justice Van Devanter stated that an
autopsy report "could not have been admitted without the consent of
the accused. . . because the accused was entitled to meet the witnesses
face to face." 17
Although that dictum has long been ignored, two recent develop-
ments may augur the resurrection of Justice Van Devanter's view.
First, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration recently re-
leased its Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program report which re-
vealed a startlingly high incidence of errors in analyses performed by
police laboratories.' 8 Second, partially in response to a growing realiza-
tion of the fallibility of police laboratories, several courts have repudi-
ated the majority view and declared that in a criminal prosecution, the
introduction of an evaluative laboratory report against the defendant is
unconstitutional. In recent years, the Supreme Courts of Penn-
sylvania' 9 and Tennessee20 have embraced the minority view. While
15. See notes 81-82 & accompanying text infra.
16. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
17.- Id at 450.
18. See notes 137-48 & accompanying text infra.
19. Commonwealth v. McCloud, 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d 653 (1974) (introduction of
evaluative reports violates defendant's confrontation rights under the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution art. 1, § 9).
20. State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977) (introduction of evaluative re-
ports violates defendant's confrontation rights under the sixth amendment of the United
States Constitution). The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has also embraced the minor-
ity view. Gregory v. State, 24 CraM L. RE'. (BNA) 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
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excluding a laboratory report on nonconstitutional grounds, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that it concurs
with the minority view; 21 and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
also seems in sympathy with that view.22
In most jurisdictions, "clear and strong" precedents say that if
properly authenticated, 23 a laboratory report is admissible against a
criminal defendant even without the analyst's live testimony.24 The
courts have admitted a wide variety of laboratory analyses: sanity com-
mission reports, 25 firearms-identification analyses, 26 blood-alcohol re-
ports, 27 autopsy findings, 28 analyses of suspected drugs, 29 psychiatric
evaluations,30 reports of poison tests,3' and analyses of vaginal fluid.32
Theories of Admissibility
To justify the admission of these reports, courts subscribing to the
majority view have accepted three theories of admissibility.
The first theory is that the laboratory report qualifies as a business
entry. Some courts apply the common-law, business-entry doctrine to
justify the report's introduction.33 Numerous courts hold that labora-
tory reports are admissible under the Uniform Business Records as Ev-
idence Act.34 Recently, in United States v. Scholle,35 the Court of
21. United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977).
22. United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971);
see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule. Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 133 n.167 (1972).
23. See, e.g., State v. Kraft, 134 N.J. Super. 416, 341 A.2d 373 (1975) (insufficient foun-
dation to authenticate the laboratory report).
24. For example, in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, 368 A.2d
1299 (1976), the authenticating witness was the librarian of the medical records department.
25. State v. Forbes, 310 So. 2d 569 (La. 1975).
26. Hardy v. State, 53 Ala. App. 75, 297 So. 2d 399 (1974).
27. People v. Porter, 46 App, Div. 2d 307, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1974).
28. State v. Reddick, 53 N.J. 66, 248 A.2d 425 (1968).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977); United States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Parker,
491 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Sanchez v. United States, 293
F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1961); United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 49 C.M.R. 380 (1974);
United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972); State v. Reardon, 172 Conn.
593, 376 A.2d 65 (1977); State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975).
30. United States v. Stem, 519 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
31. State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975).
32. Government of the Virgin Islands v. St. Ange, 458 F.2d 981 (3rd Cir. 1972); Com-
monwealth v. Ennis, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 314 N.E.2d 922 (1974).
33. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 493 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
34. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976);
State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975).
35. 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir. 1977).
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit indicated that routinely prepared drug
analyses are admissible under Federal Evidence Rule 803(6) just as
they were under the predecessor shopbook statute.36
Given the premise that the analyses are business entries, the courts
have been lax in evaluating the prosecution's foundational evidence.
The proponent of a business entry can authenticate a document simply
by proving that it comes from proper custody.37 Consequently, the
courts have permitted records custodians,38 records librarians, 39 and su-
pervising criminalists4° to serve as authenticating witnesses even when
they had no personal knowledge of the laboratory tests described in the
reports. In the same vein, most courts have been willing to accept habit
evidence to satisfy the various foundational elements of the business
entry hearsay exception.4'
Courts adhering to the majority view have been equally receptive
to the second theory that laboratory reports constitute official or public
records. Some courts rely on the common-law official-records doctrine
as the basis for the report's admission. 42 Others cite the Uniform Offi-
cial Reports as Evidence Act.43 Federal courts hnave mentioned 28
U.S.C. § 1733, the Governments Records Act as an alternative theory
of admissibility to the business records exception.44 States may have a
special statute governing the admission of the type of laboratory analy-
sis in question. 45 In the Prohibition era, for example, many states en-
acted statutes authorizing the admission of laboratory analyses of
suspected alcohoL46 Presently, many jurisdictions have statutes permit-
36. Id at 1124. The federal courts formerly invoked the federal shopbook statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), as authority for admitting laboratory reports. United States v. Parker,
491 F.2d 517 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Kay v. United States, 255
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958).
37. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 224 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
38. People v. Utter, 26 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1972); State v. Rhone, 555
S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1977); Thomas v. State, 493 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Mahaffey
v. State, 471 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), cer. denied, 405 U.S. 1018 (1972).
39. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976).
40. State v. Salter, 162 N.W.2d 427 (Iowa 1968).
41. Even if the witness did not participate in the forensic test the laboratory report
describes, the witness can lay a foundation by describing the routine manner in which the
laboratory employees conduct such tests. Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Commonwealth v. Franks, 359 Mass. 577, 270 N.E.2d 837 (1971). See also Russell v.
Pitts, 105 Ga. App. 147, 123 S.E.2d 708 (1961).
42. Seals v. State, 282 Ala. 586, 213 So. 2d 645 (1968).
43. State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1733 (1976); see United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
45. See, eg., State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 317 A.2d 781 (1974).
46. State v. Toreflo, 103 Conn. 511, 131 A. 429 (1925); Commonwealth v. Stoler, 259
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ting the admission of certificates of blood alcohol analysis.47
The foundational requirements for official records are even more
lax than those for business entries. An official record need not be au-
thenticated by a live, sponsoring witness; an attesting certificate that on
its face seems properly executed is sufficient authentication for an at-
tached copy of an official record. The courts have frequently accepted
attesting certificates as adequate foundations for police laboratory re-
ports. 48 Moreover, a laboratory report may be authenticated and ad-
mitted as an official record even when there is some defect in the
business-entry foundation for the same report.49
Finally, a few courts have accepted prosecution arguments that the
report represents the analyst's past recollection recorded. In United
States v. Marshall,50 a chemist identified the white powder seized from
the defendant as cocaine. The chemist stated that finding in his report.
At trial, however, the chemist could not remember the specific occasion
when he analyzed the powder. The prosecutor imaginatively argued
that the report was admissible as substantive evidence because it was
the chemist's past recollection recorded. The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit accepted the argument.
Objections to Admissibility
In addition to accepting the prosecution's basic theories of admis-
sibility for laboratory reports, courts adopting the majority view have
also rejected the major defense objections to admissibility. One objec-
tion is that the report's ultimate finding is an opinion rather than a
statement of fact. For example, defense counsel have contended that a
report's finding that the unknown is heroin or that the defendant's
blood alcohol concentration is .16% is too evaluative to be admissible
without supporting testimony of the one who conducted the test. There
is substantial merit in this objection. The business entry51 and official
Mass. 109, 156 N.E. 71 (1927); Commonwealth v. Slavski, 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465
(1923).
47. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 114 N.H. 222, 317 A.2d 781 (1974).
48. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958); State v. Torello, 103 Conn. 511,
131 A. 429 (1925); Bracey v. Commonwealth, 119 Va. 867, 89 S.E. 144 (1916); see C. Mc-
CORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 228 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); English,
Should Laboratory Reports be Admitted at Courts-Martial To Identf!y Illegal Drugs?, THE
ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 27, 35.
49. People v. Mack, 86 Misc. 2d 364, 382 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1976).
50. 532 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1976).
51. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 307 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
[Vol. 30
January 1979] LABORATORY REPORTS
records52 hearsay exceptions are generally limited to statements of fact.
The drug analyst does not see the unknown substance's molecular
structure, nor does the blood alcohol analyst perceive the alcohol
coursing through the defendant's brain. The findings are certainly not
"facts" in the common usage of that term.5 3 Moreover, for purposes of
the evidence law governing expert testimony, these statements would
unquestionably be considered opinions.54 The cases uniformly hold
that when an analyst personally appears to testify to these findings, he
or she must qualify as an expert because the testimony is opinion.55
Nevertheless, the majority of courts overrule this objection. One
response to the objection is that if the document falls within a doctrine
such as the business-entry exception, any opinion in the document is
admissible. That this response departs from the traditional, common-
law view of the scope of the business-entry and official-record excep-
tions is clear.56 However, some courts have explicitly stated that the
opinion restriction is inapplicable so long as the court may reasonably
assume that the analyst would have been qualified to state the opinion
from the witness stand. Thomas v. Hogan,5 7 a civil case frequently
cited in criminal cases,58 openly advocates this position. In this case,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that if a laboratory
report qualifies as a business entry, "it makes no difference whether the
record reflects an expression of. . .opinion or an observation of objec-
tive fact."59 Other courts gloss over the issue by characterizing the
opinion as a "finding,"60 "objective fact," 61 or "medical fact." 62 An-
other group of courts argues more realistically that when the scientific
test is "routine" 63 or "mechanical," 64 the scientific opinion is so reliable
52. Id §§ 315, 317.
53. Id § 12.
54. Id § 13; English, ShouldLaboratory Reports Se Admitted at Courts-Martial to Iden-
tify Illegal Drugs?, THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 27.
55. Wolford v. United States, 401 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1968); McCarthy v. United
States, 399 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1968); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE § 13 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972); English, Should Laboratory Reports Be Admitted at
Courts-Martial to Identif.y Illegal Drugs?, THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 27.
56. See notes 51-52 & accompanying text supra.
57. 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1962).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972).
59. Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1962).
60. Robertson v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1970).
61. Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 481 (4th Cir. 1958).
62. Commonwealth v. Franks, 359 Mass. 577, 580, 270 N.E.2d 837, 839 (1971).
63. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa. Super. Ct. 505, 368 A.2d 1299 (1976).
64. United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866
(1971). See also People v. Utter, 24 Cal. App. 3d 535, 101 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1976).
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that it "approximates" a statement of fact.65 The problem is that courts
fail to account for the basic difference between such routine reports and
one requiring evaluation by the expert.
The second defense objection, based on the Supreme Court's fa-
mous decision in Palmer v. Hoffman,66 has generally met the same fate
as the first. In Palmer, an accident at a railroad crossing gave rise to an
action against the railroad's trustees. The railroad prepared a litigation
report, and at trial the railroad's trustees attempted to introduce part of
the report on the railroad's behalf. The court held that the report was
inadmissible as a business entry. Many of the lower courts have con-
strued Palmer as holding that reports prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion are too suspect to be admitted on behalf of the preparing party.67
Although Palmer was a civil action, its holding has been extended to
criminal cases.68 Thus, the defense bar has urged that police laboratory
reports likewise should be regarded as inadmissible litigation reports.69
Realistically, the laboratory staff is part of the prosecution team, and
the analyst preparing the report anticipates its use in the subsequent
prosecution.
Like the first defense objection, this argument has substantial
merit. In fact, the objection has won some adherents among the courts,
including the Supreme Court of Tennessee. In State v. Henderson,70
that court stated that police laboratory reports "cannot be said to have
been prepared for any reason other than their potential litigation
value. ' 71 In dictum in United States v. Smith, 72 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia asserted that Palmer's "litigation records"
doctrine bars the use of police laboratory reports by the prosecution.73
In his vigorous dissent in State v. ]ihone,74 Judge Bardgett of the
Supreme Court of Missouri argued that the laboratory analyst must be
deemed "a member of the prosecuting team. '75
65. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 581, 45 C.M.R. 353, 355 (1972).
66. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
67. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 308 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
68. United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 965-66 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d
137 (1977).
69. English, ShouldLaboratory Reports BeAdmittedat Courts-Martialto Identify Illegal
Drugs?, THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 27.
70. 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977).
71. Id at 120.
72. 521 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73. Id at 965-66.
74. 555 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1977).
75. Id at 847.
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Despite its adherents, the Palmer objection has been rejected by
most courts considering the issue. Indeed, at least one commentator
has argued that Palmer is inapplicable because police laboratory ana-
lysts view themselves primarily as scientists rather than law enforce-
ment officers.76 With that self-image, they can be trusted to conduct
their analysis with scientific objectivity rather than prosecutorial bias.77
Other courts dismiss the Palmer objection with the rejoinder that the
analysis is "intrinsically neutral." 78 If the analysis yields the finding
that the unknown is cocaine, the finding helps the prosecution, but the
analysis might just as easily yield the opposite conclusion and thereby
aid the defendant.7 9 In the view of these courts, therefore, reports
otherwise qualifying as business entries should be excluded only when
the sole purpose for their preparation is future use against the specific
defendant.80
After the majority courts rejected these common-law objections,
the defense bar turned to the constitutional objection that the admis-
sion of these reports violates the defendant's sixth amendment guaran-
tee of confrontation.81 However, the majority courts have overruled
this objection in a sentence or two as if to suggest that the objection is
wholly frivolous. 2 As discussed below, this constitutional objection
deserves much more exacting analysis.
The Constitutional Requirement That Prosecution Hearsay
Evidence Be Reliable
The constitutional objection has received more deliberate and ex-
tended analysis in recent opinions.8 3 These decisions have created a
sharp split of authority which of itself should warrant a critical reas-
sessment of the majority view. If the shockingly high error rates in
forensic laboratory analyses revealed by the Laboratory Proficiency
Testing Programs are considered as well, a reassessment becomes an
76. English, ShouldLaboratory Reports BeAdmitted at Courts-Martialto Identify Illegal
Drugs?, THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 30.
77. Id
78. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 582, 45 C.M.R. 353, 356 (1972).
79. Id
80. People v. Foster, 27 N.Y.2d 47, 51, 313 N.Y.S.2d 384, 388, 261 N.E.2d 389, 391
(1970); Annot., 77 A.L.R.3d 137 (1977).
81. See, eg., State v. Henderson, 554 S.W.2d 117 (Tenn. 1977).
82. See, eg., United States v. Marshall, 532 F.2d 1279, 1285 (9th Cir. 1976); Robertson
v. Cox, 320 F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Va. 1971).
83. See notes 19-22 & accompanying text supra.
84. PROJECr ADIisoRY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TEsTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 1-5, at i (1975) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Justice);
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inescapable mandate. However, before discussing the peculiar consti-
tutional problems posed by police laboratory reports, the governing
constitutional standard must be identified.
The Constitutional Requirement of Reliability
There is a fair consensus that the Constitution requires prosecution
hearsay evidence to be reliable.85 Although there is some disagreement
over the source of this requirement, 86 most courts87 and commenta-
tors88 assume that it is the sixth amendment confrontation clause that
demands this reliability.89 Most observers trace the reliability require-
ment to the Supreme Court's decision in Dutton v. Evans.90 Evans was
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM, SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 6-10, at i (1976) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Justice) (on
file with The Hastings Law Journal).
85. See, e.g., State v. Reardon, 172 Conn. 593, 598, 376 A.2d 65, 67 (1977).
86. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186, 189 (1970), for example, Justice Harlan
has constructed a persuasive case that the soundest doctrinal basis for the reliability require-
ment is fifth amendment due process. Several commentators have endorsed this view.
Baker, The Right of Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process-A Proposalfor De-
termining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CONN. L. REv. 529, 543 (1974);
Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in Crimi-
nal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 743 (1965); Note, Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75
YALE L.J. 1434, 1438 (1966); Note, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 580, 596 (1971).
87. See, e.g., State v. Reardon, 172 Conn. 593, 599, 376 A.2d 65, 68 (1977).
88. See, e.g., Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99 (1972); Davenport, The Confrontation
Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions. A FunctionalAnalysis, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1378 (1972).
89. There is, moreover, a continuing controversy as to whether reliability is the only
constitutional muster prosecution hearsay must pass. See Graham, The Right of Confronta-
tion and the Hearsay Rule." Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRiM. L. BULL. 99
(1972); Westen, Confrontation and Comnpulsory Process: A Unfiled Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978); Younger, Hearsay and Confrontation, or What
Every Criminal Defense Lawyer Should Have in Mind When He Objects to the Prosecutor's
Offer of Hearsay, 2 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 65 (1976). Some argue that reliable prosecution
hearsay is admissible even when the prosecution makes no attempt to produce the declarant.
Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711, 724, 726
(1971). The proponents of this view usually cite Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Others hold that, at least when the hearsay is crucial to the prosecution or devastating to the
defense, the prosecution must not only demonstrate the reliability of the hearsay but also
make a good faith effort to produce the declarant in the courtroom. In his concurring opin-
ion in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 182 (1970), for example, Justice Harlan argued that
the confrontation clause imposes "an availability rule, one that requires the production of a
witness when he is available to testify." The proponents of this view usually rely on Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970), Justice Harlan
retreated from his position that the confrontation clause established "a preferential rule,
requiring the prosecutor to avoid the use of hearsay where it is reasonably possible for him
to do so-in other words, to produce available witnesses."
90. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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prosecuted for murder, Williams was his alleged accomplice. While in
prison, Williams stated that if it had not been for Evans, "we wouldn't
be in this now." 91 In most jurisdictions, Williams' statement would
have been inadmissible against Evans; Williams made the statement so
long after the commission of the crime that the statement would not fall
within the co-conspirator hearsay exception. 92 However, to Evans' det-
riment, his case arose in Georgia which has an extraordinarily broad
coconspirator exception-broad enough to admit even Williams' state-
ment. The trial judge accordingly admitted Williams' statement at Ev-
ans' trial, and Evans argued on appeal that the statement's admission
violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation. Writing for the
plurality, Justice Stewart carefully noted that Williams' statement was
not "crucial" or "devastating" evidence.93 He then quickly added that
the statement had sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy the con-
frontation clause.94 Justice Stewart pointed out that Williams was in a
position to know whether Evans was involved, the possibility of Wil-
liams' faulty recollection was "remote in the extreme," and Williams
had no apparent reason to lie.95 As several commentators have noted,96
a majority of the Court subsequently approved the reliability test in
Mancusi v. Stubbs.97
In light of Dutton and Mancusi, the lower courts have almost uni-
versally recognized the existence of a reliability requirement. 98 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that prosecu-
tion hearsay must have "earmarks of reliability."99 The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals reads Dutton as demanding "hallmarks of
authenticity." 10 The Supreme Court of Washington has announced its
belief that the evidence's reliability is now the Supreme Court's princi-
pal "concern" in confrontation cases.' 0 '
The commentators are in accord and generally acknowledge that
91. Id at77.
92. Id at 81.
93. Id at 87.
94. Id at 89.
95. Id at 88-89.
96. See, eg., Dow, CriminalHearsay Rules: ConstitutionalIssues, 53 NEB. L. REv. 425,
437 (1974).
97. 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972), holding that a witness' testimony at a prior trial bore
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to be admissible at present trial.
98. See, ag., State v. Lunn, 82 N.M. 526, 484 P.2d 368 (Ct. App. 1971).
99. Gassv. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 772 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (quoting Palmer v. Hoff-
man, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)).
100. United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 250, 49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974).
101. State v. Kreck, 86 Wash. 2d 112, 542 P.2d 782 (1975).
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the confrontation clause imposes a reliability requirement. 10 2 The
Court has taken a "functional approach" 10 3 and demanded that in each
case, the lower courts examine "the reliability of the proferred prosecu-
tion hearsay statement."'' 4
Factors Determining the Reliability of Prosecution Hearsay Evidence
In addition to the agreement as to the existence of the reliability
requirement there is also substantial consensus on the factors relevant
to determining reliability. The following is not an exhaustive list of the
pertinent factors, but does present those factors critical to reassessing
the majority view that laboratory reports are admissible against crimi-
nal defendants.
One pertinent factor is the objective likelihood that the hearsay
declaration is in error. A perceptive article written before Dutton ar-
gued that "the likelihood of an inaccurate report" should be a factor in
confrontation analysis. 10 5 Dutton confirmed that the likelihood of error
is indeed a proper factor in analyzing the inadmissibility of prosecution
hearsay. In Dutton, as previously noted, Justice Stewart analyzed the
reliability of Williams' statement in painstaking detail.'O He specifi-
cally underscored Williams' perception, memory, and sincerity' °7
which created strong inferences that Williams' statement was objec-
tively accurate. The likelihood of the hearsay statement's substantive
accuracy is now widely recognized as pivotal in evaluating prosecution
hearsay.108
Another factor is how directly the hearsay statement relates to the
crime's essential elements. The Court acknowledged this factor in
some of its very early confrontation decisions, Kirby v. United States,0 9
decided in 1899, and Dowdell v. United States,110 decided in 1911. In
102. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions:.,4 FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1378, 1379-93 (1972); Dow, Criminal
Hearsay Rules: Constitutional Issues, 53 NEB. L. REv. 425 (1974); Supreme Court Review, 62
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 516 (1971); Note, The Burger Court and the Confrontation Clause" At
Return to the Fair Trial Rule, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PRoc. 136, 150 (1973); Comment, 37 LA.
L. REv. 1101, 1110 (1977); Recent Case, 22 CASE WEST. L. REV. 575 (1971).
103. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1378, 1393 (1972).
104. Id at 1380.
105. Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 748 (1965).
106. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
107. Id at 89.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1080-82 (9th Cir. 1977).
109. 174 U.S. 47, 54-55 (1899).
110. 221 U.S. 325 (1911).
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Kirby, the Court held the admission of Kirby's accomplices' conviction
violated the defendant's sixth amendment confrontation rights and
stressed that the prosecution had used the conviction to prove a "vital
fact" in Kirby's case."' In contrast, the Dowdell Court stressed the
liberal admissibility of "documentary evidence to establish collateral
facts." 112
The essential-element factor has surfaced in Warren and Burger
Court confrontation decisions. In Douglas v. Alabama'1 3 and Bruton v.
United States,' 14 the Warren Court dealt with situations in which the
jury was likely to misuse prosecution hearsay evidence. In Douglas,
when the defendant's accomplice invoked the privilege against self-in-
crimination on the stand, the prosecutor, purporting to refresh the ac-
complice's recollection, read the accomplice's confession in open court.
The Court held that this procedure violated Douglas' confrontation
rights. Justice Brennan emphasized that the accomplice's statement
was "the only direct evidence" that Douglas had fired the weapon.' 5
Bruton was a joint trial. Bruton's co-defendant had confessed, but
the confession was inadmissible against Bruton. The co-defendant did
not testify. The trial judge admitted the confession at the joint trial
with a limiting instruction that the jury could not consider the confes-
sion in deciding Bruton's guilt. The Court held that there was too great
a risk that the jury misused the confession as evidence against Bruton.
Once again Justice Brennan authored the lead opinion, and once again
he took up the theme of the importance of the challenged evidence. In
his judgment, the accomplice's confession was "devastating" to
Bruton. 116
Rather than breaking with the Warren Court on this issue, the
Burger Court has continued to scrutinize the effect the challenged hear-
say would have on the outcome of the case. In Dutton, the plurality
stated that Williams' statement was "of peripheral significance at
most." 17 Justice Stewart distinguished Douglas and Bruton on the pre-
cise ground that the evidence in those cases was "crucial" or
"devastating.""18
A third factor in determining the reliability of prosecution hearsay
111. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56, 60 (1899).
112. Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911).
113. 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
114. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
115. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965).
116. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
117. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970).
118. Id
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is whether the trier of fact is likely to give the hearsay evidence its
proper weight. This factor is traceable to a cryptic passage which has
appeared in several recent confrontation decisions: "a satisfactory basis
for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." 19 Justice White
coined the expression in Caifornia v. Green 120 while explaining that the
cross-examination of a witness at a trial about a prior statement made
by that very witness satisfied the confrontation clause. In the course of
this explanation, he stated that although the cross-examination was not
contemporaneous with the prior statement, it gave the jury "a satisfac-
tory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."'12 ' Later, in
Dutton, Justice Stewart stated that the jury had "a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of' Williams' prior statement. 122 Justice Rehn-
quist used the same language when he delivered the opinion of the
Court in Mancusi.123
Most lower courts simplistically have equated this language with
"indicia of reliability," the indications of the hearsay's substantive ac-
curacy. 124 However, the sounder meaning to be given to the expression
is the jury's ability to give the evidence its proper weight. In several
confrontation opinions the Supreme Court has expressed its concern
about the jury's ability to do just that. In Green, for example, the Court
refers to "the jury's ability to assess the reliability of the evidence it
hears."'125 In Dutton, Justice Stewart voiced confidence that the jury
would not give Williams' statement "undue weight" because it was
rather ambiguous, 126 and in Davis v. Alaska,127 the Court stated that
the jury must be in a position to "make an informed judgment as to the
weight to place on" prosecution evidence. 28
Furthermore, two of the leading Supreme Court confrontation de-
cisions, Douglas129 and Bruton130 can be explained in terms of the
weight the jury gives hearsay evidence. In Douglas, the prosecutor's
reading of the accomplice's confession was not entitled to any substan-
119. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970).
120. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
121. Id at 161.
122. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
123. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213, 216 (1972).
124. United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973); State v. Speerschneider,
25 Ariz. App. 340, 543 P.2d 461 (1975).
125. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 n.16 (1970).
126. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970).
127. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
128. Id at 317.
129. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
130. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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tive weight because the confession was admitted for the sole purpose of
refreshing the accomplice's memory. The key to the Court's holding is
its conclusion that the jury probably did not give the reading its proper
weight but instead treated the confession as substantive evidence of
Douglas' guilt. 131 The same analysis explains the result in Bruton.
Under the narrow federal co-conspirator doctrine, the accomplice's
confession was admissible against the accomplice but not against
Bruton. As against Bruton, the confession was incompetent hearsay,
and the jury should not have given it any substantive weight in its de-
liberation on his guilt. However, as in Douglas, the Bruton Court quite
correctly feared that the jury would not have given the confession its
proper weight but would rather misuse the confession and consider it as
substantive proof of Bruton's guilt.132
Factoring into reliability analysis the jury's ability to give prosecu-
tion evidence its proper weight serves the purpose of the confrontation
clause. In Dutton, Justice Stewart found that Evans had no real need to
cross-examine Williams. The possibility that Evans could discredit
Williams was "wholly unreal"; 133 and since on its face the statement
was ambiguous, the jury would not give the statement "undue
weight."' 134 In such circumstances, there is little need for cross-exami-
nation. If, on the other hand, the justice had found that the jurors were
likely to misjudge the statement's weight, then the need for personal
confrontation in the courtroom would be evident. The jurors would
need the benefit of the defense attorney's cross-examination to clarify
and qualify the hearsay statement.
In summary, in deciding whether prosecution hearsay has the req-
uisite reliability, the courts should consider at least the following fac-
tors: (1) the likelihood that the hearsay is substantively accurate; (2)
how directly the hearsay relates to the crime's essential elements; and
(3) the likelihood that the jury will give the hearsay its proper weight.
Application of the Constitutional Reliability Requirement to the
Majority View
Having identified the factors relevant to reliability analysis, this
Article will now analyze the majority view in light of them.
131. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1965).
132. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 125-37 (1968).
133. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
134. d at 88.
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The Likelihood That The Hearsay Is Substantively Accurate
Just as lay jurors tend to attach too much weight to lay eyewitness
testimony, 135 attorneys tend to attach too much weight to scientific evi-
dence.136 However, the Laboratory Proficiency Testing Program report
should give the legal community a more realistic view of the possibility
of error in forensic analysis. The program began in fall, 1974. Between
235 and 240 crime laboratories from throughout the United States par-
ticipated in the program. 137 To test the accuracy of these crime labora-
tories, the Project Advisory Committee prepared samples and
submitted them to the laboratories for evaluation. The Committee
knew the data that a proper forensic analysis of the samples would gen-
erate, and the Committee judged the laboratories' reports against that
known data.
The report's findings are alarming. In Test #3, the Committee
submitted blood for analysis. Of the laboratories typing for the MN
system, only sixty percent reached the correct conclusion.138 In Test
#6, the Committee submitted drugs for evaluation. One hundred sev-
enty-nine laboratories participated in this test. Only 70.4% correctly
concluded that the mixture included cocaine. 139 In Test #8, the Com-
mittee again submitted blood for analysis. In this test, one question
was whether two bloodstains could have shared a common origin.
Only 37.4% of the laboratories reached the correct conclusion. 140 Test
#9 was similar to Test #8; the Committee submitted glass for common-
origin testing. Here only 69.6% of the participating laboratories
reached the correct finding. 14 1 Test #10 involved the submission of
135. See Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminalldenification The Gapfrom Wade
to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1081-82 (1973).
136. There seem to be two causes for this phenomenon. First, few attorneys have suffi-
cient scientific expertise to even realize the weaknesses in various types of scientific evi-
dence. Second, lawyers view themselves as professionals and, as such, often have an
unjustifiably high regard for other professionals, including scientists.
137. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 1-5, at i (1975) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Justice);
PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM, SUPPLE-
MENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 6-10, at i (1976) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Justice) (on
file with The Hastings Law Journal).
138. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 1-5, at 6 (1975)(prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Justice)
(on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
139. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 6-10, at 3 (1976) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
140. Id at 7.
141. Id at 9.
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paint samples for common-origin testing. Only fifty percent of the par-
ticipating laboratories reported correct test results.142 In Test #13, the
Committee submitted physiological fluid for analysis. Only eighteen
percent of the participating laboratories correctly reported a conclusive
finding that the fluid was saliva.143 The Committee recently released
the results of the final six tests, 144 and the results were comparable to
those of the earlier tests.145
As the Committee cautioned, it is dangerous to generalize from
these results: "The Project Advisory Committee could have composed
or manufactured samples that would have guaranteed a 99% correct
response rate, or samples that would have resulted in a 5% correct re-
sponse rate. Due to this variation in degree of difficulty, the actual
percentage of laboratories submitting correct or incorrect responses
may not reflect the actual capability of the participating laborato-
ries."'146 However, the report unquestionably documents a very real
possibility of error in the forensic analyses conducted by police labora-
tories in the United States. In Dutton, Justice Stewart thought that it
was "inconceivable" that Evans' cross-examination of Williams would
discredit Williams;147 the possibility of demonstrating the unreliability
of Williams' statement was "wholly unreal."1 48 In light of the Labora-
tory Proficiency Testing Program, the same cannot be said of cross-
examination of a laboratory analyst.
How Directly the Hearsay Relates to the Crime's Essential Elements
In a high percentage of the reported cases, the conclusion stated in
the laboratory reports introduced by the prosecutor is directly relevant
to an essential element of the charged crime. In driving-under-the-in-
fluence prosecutions, the courts have admitted reports stating blood al-
cohol levels that presumptively placed the defendant under the
142. Id at 11.
143. PRoJEcT ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 11-15, at 7 (1977) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
144. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Newsletter, Sept. 1978, at 1.
145. The results of the hair analysis, Test #18, are particularly shocking. Fifty percent
of the participating laboratories failed to identify dog hair, fifty-four percent deer hair, and
sixty-seven percent cow hair. Id at 5. See also TRIAL, Oct. 1978, at 9.
146. PROJECT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT-SAMPLES 11-15, at 1 (1977) (prepared for the U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice) (on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
147. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 (1970).
148. Id at 89.
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influence. 149 In drug prosecutions, the courts have often admitted re-
ports stating the contraband character of drugs seized from the defend-
ant.1 50 When the issue is insanity, the courts have sometimes admitted
sanity commission reports without supporting psychiatric testimony. 51
In Dutton Justice Stewart emphatically denied that Williams'
statement was "crucial" to the prosecution or "devastating" to the de-
fense. 152 Usually when the prosecutor offers a police laboratory report
it will be crucial to the case. Indeed, unless the issue is of practical
importance in the case, the issue will not merit the expenditure of pre-
cious laboratory resources. Moreover, in many cases, the report will be
not only practically important but also absolutely essential to the prose-
cution in order to prevent a directed verdict for the defendant. For
example, without proof that the substance seized from the defendant is
a contraband drug, the drug prosecution will be dismissed. In the typi-
cal case in which the prosecution offers a forensic report, this factor
will be essential to the case and will therefore cut in favor of finding a
constitutional violation unless the defendant has a right to confront the
one who conducted the test.
The Likelihood That the Jury Will Give The Hearsay Its Proper Weight
Some scientific fields have relatively objective standards for evalu-
ating test results. For example, in fingerprint identification, classifica-
tion systems 153 and standards for identification are universally
recognized.' 54 However, other scientific fields have few, if any, objec-
tive standards. There is, for example, a large element of subjectivity in
the interpretation of polygraphs,155 and the opinions of forensic pathol-
149. People v. Porter, 46 App. Div. 2d 307, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1974).
150. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1123-25 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1235-37 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Parker, 491 F.2d 517, 520-21
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 989 (1974); Sanchez v. United States, 293 F.2d 260 (8th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 249-50, 49 C.M.R. 380, 382 (1974);
United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972); State v. Reardon, 172 Conn.
593, 376 A.2d 65 (1977); State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975).
151. State v. Forbes, 310 So. 2d 569, 570 (La. 1975).
In Gregory v. State, 24 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), the
Maryland court adopted the minority view and excluded a psychiatric report. The defend-
ant had raised an insanity defense. The court characterized the evidence as "critical evi-
dence... pertaining to the appellant's ultimate guilt." Id. at 2015.
152. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87 (1970).
153. See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN -ScIENrIIc EVIDENCE §§ 18.1-.14 (2d ed. 1974); A.
MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, ScENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN CRIMNAL CASES §§ 7.01-.13
(1973).
154. Id
155. See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EvIDENCE §§ 10.1-.22 (2d ed. 1974); A.
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ogists are often highly judgmental. 156 We shall term these latter reports
evaluative. When the subject of the report is evaluative, equally quali-
fied experts in the field will often reach conflicting opinions on the very
same facts.157 Precedent and principle compel the conclusion that there
is too great a likelihood that a lay trier of fact will generally be unable
to determine the proper weight to assign to an evaluative opinion in a
police laboratory report if they do not have the opportunity to have the
expert cross-examined.
The precedents under the traditional, common-law, business-entry
and official-records hearsay exceptions recognized the distinction be-
tween routine and evaluative reports and excluded the latter from jury
deliberation. 58 The issue arose most frequently when parties in civil
actions offered medical reports. 59 The courts were willing to admit
statements which were "objective observations of occurrences."' 60
However, when the diagnosis was "subject to debate"' 61 and the opin-
ion involved "judgment or discretion on complex data,"' 62 the courts
ordinarily excluded the medical record. 63
Indeed, some of the cases admitting police laboratory reports con-
cede the danger of admitting evaluative reports.164 One of the most fre-
quently cited precedents in this area is Commonwealth v. Slavski,165 a
1923 Massachusetts decision. The Slavski court upheld the admission
of a written analysis of suspected moonshine. In its decision, however,
MOENSSENS, R. MosEs & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 14.01-.12
(1973).
156. See J. RICHARDSON, MODERN ScIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 5.01-.11.
157. See Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence, 21 MD. L. Riv. 22, 43
(1961); Article, Admitting Recorded Hearsay: A Comparison of Past Recollection Recorded
and Business Records, 9 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 147, 162 (1976); Note, Confrontation, Cross-
Examination, and the Right to Prepare a Defense, 56 GEO. L.J. 939, 944-45 (1968); Note, 113
U. PA. L. REv. 741, 765 (1965). See also McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of
Reports of Official Investigation?, 42 IowA L. REv. 363, 364-67 (1957); Yates, Evaluative
Reports by Public Officials-Admissible as Official Statements?, 30 TEX. L. Rrv. 112 (1951).
158. See Garland, Hospital Records: Legal Requirements ofProof, 59 ILL. B.J. 312, 313
(1970); Powell, Admissibility ofHospitalRecords into Evidence, 21 MD. L. Rnv. 22,43 (1961).
159. Garland, Hospital Records: Legal Requirements ofProof, 59 ILL. B.J. 312 (1970);
Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence, 21 MD. L. REv. 22 (1961).
160. Garland, Hospital Records: Legal Requirements oProof, 59 ILL. BJ. 312, 313-14
(1970).
161. Powell, Admissibility of Hospital Records into Evidence, 21 MD. L. REv. 22, 43
(1961).
162. Note, 56 GEo. LJ. 939, 945 (1968).
163. Id; Dunsmore, Hospital Records as Evidence, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 459, 462-63
(1959).
164. See, ag., Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958).
165. 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465 (1923).
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the court stressed that since the report's accuracy did not depend on the
subjective abilities of the analyst, there was little room for variation or
misanalysis.166 In Boehme v. Maxwell, 67 a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, the trial court admitted a report of an instrumental blood
analysis for poison. The court pointed out, however, that the test en-
tailed "the use of an automatic machine" and that the analyst's only
tasks were "merely putting the samples into the machine and reading
the results."'168 More recently, in People v. Porter,169 a New York court
dealt with the admission of a chemist's report in a prosecution for driv-
ing while intoxicated. The court said that "the conclusion to be drawn
was not a matter of judgment but merely one of mathematical
computation." 170
However, the most trenchant analysis appears in the cases follow-
ing the minority view which excludes evaluative reports. In Common-
wealth v. McCloud,17 1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania excluded an
autopsy report stating an opinion about the legal cause of death. The
court wrote that an opinion on that subject is "at best a conclusion
based on interpretation of often conflicting medical opinion."' 72 In
Phillips v. Neil, 73 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected
psychiatric reports. The court remarked that psychiatry is "a field of
conjecture. Even in the diagnosis of actual insanity, cases are rare in
which trained psychiatric witnesses do not come to opposite conclu-
sions."' 174 One commentator endorsed the result in Phillps, recognizing
that the soundness of the declarant's opinions "could not be adequately
tested without cross-examination of the declarant."'' 75 Finally, in
United States v. Beasley,176 the same court clearly distinguished routine
from evaluative reports. On the one hand, the court approved the ad-
166. Id at 417, 140 N.E. at 469.
167. 309 F. Supp. 1106 (N.D. Wash. 1968), affd, 423 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1970).
168. 309 F. Supp. at 1109.
169. 46 App. Div. 2d 307, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1974).
170. Id at 312, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
171. 457 Pa. 310, 322 A.2d 653 (1974).
172. Id at 312, 322 A.2d at 655.
173. 452 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884 (1972).
174. Id at 347 (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 304 (D.C. Cir.
1945)).
175. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions. A Functional Analys, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1378, 1382 n.23 (1972).
In Gregory v. State, 24 CRsM. L. REP. (BNA) 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978), the
Maryland court reached a similar result. In excluding a psychiatric report, the court noted
"the frequency with which well-qualified and presumedly competent practitioners express
different-and sometimes widely varying--opinions." Id. at 2015.
176. 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
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mission of a sheet on which a laboratory technician processed a latent
palm print. The court stated that the processing was "mechanical [and]
routine."' 77 On the other hand, the court indicated that "the finger-
printing expert who matched the laboratory's print with those of the
Appellant . . . , properly, was presented at trial and cross-ex-
amined."' 78 Beasley represents a particularly strict application of the
minority view, since there are fairly objective standards for fingerprint
comparison.179 However, Beasley certainly highlights the danger of ad-
mitting evaluative reports.
Principle as well as precedent supports the proposition that the ad-
mission of evaluative laboratory reports is unconstitutional. In all the
cases in which the Supreme Court has rejected confrontation chal-
lenges to prosecution hearsay, the hearsay declarant has been a lay per-
son.' 80 A lay juror can appreciate the perception, memory, and
narration problems another lay person will encounter. However, evalu-
ative laboratory reports are two steps removed from the admission of
lay hearsay declarations. First, almost any laboratory report will be an
expert analysis. The traditional view is that expert testimony is admissi-
ble only when the subject-matter is beyond the comprehension or ken
of the average lay person. 18' The admission of any expert report thus
calls into question the jury's ability to assign the report its proper
weight. The problem is compounded because of the second step: Now
we are dealifig with an evaluative expert report-a report in a field
where even experts might disagee.182
In Richardson v. Perales,183 the Supreme Court dealt with a due
process challenge to a Social Security Act administrative proceeding.
The purpose of the proceeding was to determine whether the claimant
was disabled, and the hearing officer admitted written reports of physi-
cians who examined the claimant. The confrontation clause is inappli-
cable to administrative proceedings,184 and even the due process
standard is relaxed in that context.'8 5 Yet, in finding that there was no
177. Id at 1281.
178. Id
179. See notes 161-62 & accompanying text supra.
180. See, ag., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
181. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972).
182. See notes 155-56 & accompanying text supra.
183. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
184. By its terms, the sixth amendment confrontation guarantee applies only to criminal
prosecutions. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
185. 2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 351 (1962); see, eg., Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420 (1960).
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due process violation, the Court felt compelled to stress that the tests
the physicians conducted were "routine [and] standard."1 86 When the
hearsay statement is an evaluative opinion in a laboratory report, com-
mon sense dictates that there is too great a risk that the lay "jury will
not properly assess the weight to be given to the statement."18 7 In this
situation, the report's admission would violate the Dutton mandate that
the lay jury have "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth" of the
evaluative opinion. 88
All three factors, reliability, essential element, and proper weight,
therefore, point to the conclusion that the admission of evaluative labo-
ratory reports violates the defendant's constitutional rights.
Counterarguments
This analysis cannot be concluded, of course, without reviewing
several obvious and substantial counterarguments. The first counter-
argument is that the proposed standard is not judicially manageable in
that it requires lay judges to distinguish between routine and evaluative
reports. However, the proposed standard is the same standard the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has used for several years in
discovery cases.' 89 That court grants the defendant a right to an in-
dependent forensic examination of physical evidence when the analysis
is "subject to varying expert opinion."'190 If the opinion is evaluative
and "subject to expert disagreement,"' 91 the defendant may inspect the
physical evidence and submit it to his or her own expert for evaluation.
The wide acceptance of the learned-treatise hearsay exception is further
evidence of the growing confidence in the ability of attorneys and
judges to work with scientific materials. 192
Moreover, this counterargument becomes moot if the courts place
the burden of establishing that the report's subject matter is too evalua-
tive on the defendant. The Fifth Circuit has assigned the defendant that
burden in its discovery decisions by requiring the defendant "bear the
burden to prove that the [analysis] ...is subject to disagreement."'' 93
186. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971).
187. Note, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence
in Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 741, 747 (1965).
188. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
189. See, e.g., Barnard v. Henderson, 514 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1975).
190. id at 746.
191. White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1977).
192. The Federal Rules of Evidence include that exception. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
Most of the states that have adopted the Rules have also adopted that exception.
193. White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Applying the same rationale to laboratory reports, courts could require
the defendant to establish that reports otherwise qualifying as business
entries or official records are nonetheless inadmissable because they
are subject to varying opinions. At the very least, the defendant would
have to present texts and articles documenting the lack of objective cri-
teria in the particular scientific field.194
The second counterargument is that the proposed standard would
place too great a burden on police laboratories. This standard will
have the predictable result of straining the laboratories' resources by
forcing analysts to spend an undue amount of time in the courtroom.
The laboratories are already overburdened, the argument continues,
and the adoption of the standard will exact too great a cost and unduly
impede the effective administration of the criminal justice system.
However, the argument overstates the foreseeable results of the
adoption of the proposed standard. The standard does not apply to all
laboratory reports; it would exclude only highly evaluative reports.
Even more narrowly, if the courts follow the lead of the Fifth Circuit,
the standard will exclude only reports the defendant can demonstrate
to be highly evaluative. 195 Thus, the standard is not a blanket ban on
the admission of police laboratory reports and its adoption should not
cause the laboratories undue hardship.
Moreover, the argument makes the unwarranted assumption that
the standard's adoption will necessarily force the analyst to leave the
laboratory to testify. Several jurisdictions are now experimenting with
the use of closed-circuit television 96 and picturephones 97 for the pres-
entation of testimony. In one case, Kansas City v. McCoy, 98 closed-
circuit television was used in a drug prosecution to present the chem-
ist's testimony. 199 The use of closed-circuit television-and the pic-
194. Although the use of the texts as substantive evidence might seem subject to a hear-
say objection, there are several counterarguments. First, at this point in the trial, the attor-
ney is litigating preliminary facts rather than the historical merits. In many jurisdictions, the
technical exclusionary doctrines such as the hearsay rule do not apply to the litigation of
preliminary facts. See FED. R. Evm. 104(a). Second, a growing number of jurisdictions
now recognize the learned treatise hearsay exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(18). Finally,
the Court could simply authorize the receipt of texts and articles on this issue by judicial fiat.
195. White v. Maggio, 556 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (5th Cir. 1977).
196. Scurlock, Basic Principles of the Adinistration of Criminal Justice with Particular
Reference to Missouri Law, 44 U. Mo. KAN. Crry L. Rnv. 139, 322 (1975); Casenote, 44 U.
Mo. KAN. Cry L. REv. 517 (1976).
197. Haeberle, Court Congestion andDelaj-Use ofSpeaker Telephones orPicturephones
in Civil Cases Wen Witnesses Are Not Available-4 Proposal, 10 LINCOLN L. Rlv. 99
(1977).
198. 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975).
199. Id. at 337.
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turephone would reduce the burden created by the proposed standard.
In any case, economic hardship on the state is a weak argument when
one is confronting an important constitutional right.
A third counterargument contends that it is pointless to produce
the analyst. Analysts usually conduct hundreds or thousands of tests,
and it is unlikely that they would remember the occasion of the particu-
lar test in question. Justice Harlan voiced this argument in his concur-
ring opinion in Dutton: "A rule requiring production of available
witnesses would significantly curtail development of the law of evi-
dence to eliminate the necessity for production of declarants where pro-
duction would be unduly inconvenient and of small utility to a
defendant." 2°° Since the analyst will probably not remember the par-
ticular test, his or her appearance would be of "extremely limited util-
ity" to the defendant.20' "It is impossible for a police laboratory
chemist to recall the tests he performed and their results in an individ-
ual narcotics case of a routine nature. '202
This counterargument is unsound. As previously stated, the foun-
dational requirements for business entries and official records are very
lax.203 For example, a witness can authenticate a business entry by evi-
dence of its proper custody and lay the hearsay foundation with habit
testimony.2°4 Applying these doctrines, courts have admitted labora-
tory reports when the analyst was unidentified, 05 when the analyst's
qualifications were unknown,2°6 and when there was no showing of the
manner in which the test was conducted.207 Given these lax founda-
tional requirements, the report's admission reveals virtually nothing to
the jury about the analyst or the specific analysis conducted. In con-
trast, if the analyst testified personally, the defense attorney could prof-
itably explore such subjects as the analyst's qualifications and testing
procedures.208
It might then be argued that the proper solution is stricter founda-
tional requirements, rather than the analyst's personal appearance. For
200. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 (1970).
201. As an example of his point Justice Harlan cited Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476
(4th Cir. 1958) (admitting laboratory analysis).
202. In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 523, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (Fain. Ct. 1975).
203. See notes 37-41, 48-49 & accompanying text supra.
204. Id.
205. Commonwealth v. Ennis, 317 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. App. 1974).
206. Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 1962).
207. Id.
208. Prosecutors' trial techniques texts often urge them to attack defense experts' creden-
tials. Zagel, Psychiatric Issues and Criminal Law.- The Prosecution Viewpoint, in THE PROSE-
CUTOR'S DESKBOOK 575, 579 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971).
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example, the foundational requirements could be revised to include
proof of the analyst's credentials. That solution would be satisfactory
in the case of routine reports. However, the solution is inadequate in
the case of evaluative reports. In that case, one of the most profitable
areas for cross-examination is the lack of objective standards for evalu-
ating the test results. The defense attorney can force the analyst to con-
cede the absence of such standards and to verbalize the standards the
analyst employed. This tactic is a favorite of prosecutors impeaching
defense psychiatrists. 20 9
The final counterargument is that the fairest solution is to permit
the prosecution to introduce the report but to guarantee the defense the
right to subpoena the analyst. This solution would ordinarily save the
prosecution the inconvenience of producing the analyst as a witness. 210
In effect, this argument holds that since the defendant has an opportu-
nity to use compulsory process to subpoena the analyst, he is foreclosed
from raising any confrontation or due process challenges to the written
analysis.21' The argument is superficially appealing and even finds
some support in scattered passages in Supreme Court opinions.212
209. Id.; W. Alexander, Meeting the Insanity Defense, in THE PROSECUTOR'S DESKBOOK
592 (P. Healy & J. Manak eds. 1971) (prosecutor should show the jury that the defense
psychiatrist's standards are "nebulous"). Numerous articles on prosecutorial trial tactics
counsel the prosecutor to discredit the defense psychiatrist by exposing the subjective, judg-
mental nature of psychiatric opinions. E.g, id Stricter foundational requirements would be
an inadequate substitute for cross-examination exposing the personal, subjective standards
the analyst used to reach the evaluative opinion. By exposing the subjectivity of the ana-
lyst's standards, the defense attorney can largely destroy the analyst's claim to scientific
objectivity.
210. Some jurisdictions have opted for this solution by case law, United States v. Stem,
519 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Snider, 168 Mont. 220, 541 P.2d 1204 (1975); In re
Arthur, 27 N.C. App. 227, 218 S.E.2d 869 (1975), rev'don other grounds, 281 N.C. 640, 231
S.E.2d 614 (1977); while others have special statutes, State v. Davison, 245 N.W.2d 321
(Iowa 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977); State v. Kramer, 231 N.W.2d 874 (Iowa 1975);
State v. Forbes, 310 So. 2d 569 (La. 1975); State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 297 A.2d 223
(1972).
211. English, Should Laboratory Reports BeAdmitted at Courts-Martialto Identify Illegal
Drugs? THE ARMY LAWYER, May 1978, at 30-31.
212. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 n.19 (1970), Mr. Justice Stewart's plurality
opinion points out that "[o]f course Evans had the right to subpoena witnesses." The justice
did not explain the significance of that fact. In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan
stated, "Although the fact is not necessary to my conclusion, I note that counsel for Evans
conceded at oral argument that he could have secured Williams' presence to testify, but
decided against it." Id at 96 n.3. In dissent, Justice Marshall asserted that notwithstanding
Evans' ability to subpoena Williams, "it remains that the duty to confront a criminal defend-
ant with the witnesses against him falls upon the State." Id at 102 n.4. It is difficult to deal
with this argument because so few Supreme Court decisions deal with the sixth amendment
compulsory process gurarantee, much less with its relation to the confrontation and due
process clauses. However, in this author's mind the counterargument is unacceptable. Some
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This counterargument is suspect as a matter of construction. The
sixth amendment's wording guarantees the defendant two distinct
rights: confrontation and compulsory process. 213 The counterargument
virtually merges the confrontation clause into the compulsory-process
clause. One court has stated, for example, that "the accused can assert
his right to cross-examination [confrontation] by calling the declarant
as a witness. ' 214 This solution effectively abolishes the defendant's
confrontation right and leaves the defendant with only the guarantee of
compulsory process. Whenever possible, however, a court should con-
strue separate provisions in a legal document as having independent
force.2 15 Accepting this counterargument would violate that construc-
tional maxim.
The counterargument also seems inconsistent with past Supreme
Court confrontation decisions. For example, the Dutton opinion makes
the implicit assumption that the hearsay declarant's amenability to
compulsory process is not determinative of the confrontation issue. If
the true facts were as stated in the opinion, Evans could have subpoe-
naed Williams. 216 Nevertheless, the Dutton Court reached the merits
of Evans' confrontation claim.217 On its facts, Dutton stands for the
proposition that Williams' amenability to process did not moot Evans'
confrontation claim. Citing Dutton and several other Supreme Court
confrontation decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
concluded that the hearsay declarant's availability to the defense does
not preclude a constitutional challenge under the sixth amendment
confrontation clause to the hearsay's admissibility.218
The argument that compulsory process satisfies confrontation
rights is difficult to reconcile not only with past confrontation prece-
dents but also with the policy underlying the confrontation clause. In
of the leading Supreme Court decisions on compulsory process are: Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 338
U.S. 14 (1967). See also Imwinkelried, Chambers v. Mississippi" The Constitutional Right to
Present Defense Evidence, 62 MIL. L. REv. 225 (1973).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
214. United States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 250, 49 C.M.R. 380, 383 (1974).
215. J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS §§ 115-116 (1974); 2A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1973).
216. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88 n. 19 (1970); see Liacos, The Right ofConfrontation
and the Hearsay Rule -Another Look, 34 AM. TRIAL LAW. J. 153, 165 (1972).
217. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
218. Hoover v. Beto, 439 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'don rehearing, 467 F.2d 516 (5th
Cir. 1972). Even in reversing, the court reached the merits of the confrontation claim and
discussed the reliability of the proffered evidence. 467 F.2d at 531-34.
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an often-quoted passage21 9 in Mattox v. United States,2 20 Justice Brown
declared:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question [the
confrontation clause] was to prevent depositions or exparte affida-
vits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-ex-
amination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity,
not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the
witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in
order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon
the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he
is worthy of belief.221
The logic of the counterargument would lead to results contrary to that
policy as in United States v. Lloyd2  when "[tihe only evidence offered
by the government was a certified and authenticated copy of Lloyd's
Selective Service file." 2 Historical evidence indicates that the Found-
ing Fathers intended to ban precisely this result: cases wherein the
prosecution's only evidence consists of relatively formal documents
such as affidavits to which the jury is likely to attach great weight.2 24
That is the very result which is possible under the majority view which
permits the admission of formal, evaluative laboratory reports to which
the lay jurors may attach undue weight.
Conclusion
It is important to recognize the limited scope of the constitutional
standard proposed in this Article. Laboratory reports which otherwise
qualify as business entries or official records may continue to be pre-
sumptively admissible against criminal defendants. The defendants
would then have the burden of demonstrating that more likely than not
the conclusion expressed in the report is so evaluative that it could be
the subject of varying expert opinion. However, once the defendant
sustains that burden, the prosecution may not introduce the report as
direct evidence of an essential element of the crime. That use is forbid-
den by the constitutional reliability requirement because there is an in-
219. Eg., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 7.19, 721 (1968).
220. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
221. Id at 242-43.
222. 431 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1970).
223. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 711,
726 (1971). Lloyd won Professor Graham's nomination for "the All-Time Confrontation
Hall of Horrors." Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Canm. L. BULL. 99, 131 n.158 (1972).
224. Graham, he Right of Confrontation andthe Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 Cram. L. BULL. 99, 130 (1972).
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tolerably high risk that lay jurors will assign an improper weight to the
expert's evaluative report.
It is conceivable that the constitutional standard could admit of
special exceptions. If the prosecution demonstrates the declarant's un-
availability, for example, this might factor into the court's admissibility
analysis.225 The showing of necessity would be especially compelling if
the declarant was absolutely unavailable and the scientific test could
not be duplicated. 226 Any attempt to delineate the proper exceptions to
the norm fashioned here, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
Like Dean Wigmore, Dean McCormick viewed himself as some-
thing of a prophet of the evolution of evidence law. He once remarked
that "the manifest destiny of evidence law is a progressive lowering of
the barriers" to admissibility. 227 In large part, history has borne out his
prophecy. For example, many commentators have viewed the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules228 and the numerous state codes patterned
after them as a triumph for the concept of logical relevance. The gen-
eral effect of the Rules has certainly been to liberalize admissibility
standards.
Despite this gradual liberalization of admissibility standards, the
Supreme Court has fashioned new exclusionary rules as safeguards
against the admission of particularly unreliable and damaging evi-
dence.229 The courts should now frame a new constitutional exclusion-
ary rule precluding the admission of evaluative laboratory reports.
This Article has demonstrated that the trier of fact is likely to attach
225. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279, 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 866 (1971); Henson v. Redman, 419 F. Supp. 678 (D. Del. 1976).
226. People v. Porter, 46 App. Div. 2d 307, 362 N.Y.S.2d 249 (1974).
227. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 81 (1954).
228. Evans, Article Eight of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Hearsay Rule, 8 VAL.
U.L. REv. 261,300-01 (1974); Imwinkehied, The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in
the Federal Rules ofEvidence, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 239, 261 (1978); Stewart, Perception,
Memory and Hearsay. .4 Criticism of Present Law and The Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6-7; Note, A Practitioner's Guide to the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 169, 189-90 (1975).
229. There have been other important cross-currents in evidence law. In Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), the Supreme Court announced the inadmissibility of evidence
of unnecessarily suggestive, unreliable lineups. Id at 302. In United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), the Court decreed a counsel
requirement at lineups conducted after the initiation of the adversary judicial process. See
also Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972). In the final analysis, the trilogy of Stovail,
Wade, and Gilbert represents the Court's conclusion that the trier of fact does not realize the
critical weaknesses of lay eyewitnesses identification and, hence, tends to attach undue
weight to such identification. Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of CriminalIdenification The
Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973).
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undue weight to these reports. The Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Program report, moreover, is convincing proof that the admission of
such reports creates a grave possibility of injustice.

